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Abstract 
When the increase in income reduces the time of search and increases prices of purchases, the 
increase in price can be presented as the increase in the willingness to pay for insurance. The 
optimal consumer decision represents the trade-off between the propensity to search for 
proficient insurance and marginal savings on insurance policy. Under price dispersion the 
indirect utility function takes the form of cubic parabola, where the saddle point represents the 
comprehensive insurance. The comparative static analysis of the saddle point of the utility 
function discovers the ambiguity of the departure from risk-neutrality. This ambiguity can 
produce the ordinary risk seeking behavior as well as mathematical catastrophes of Veblen-
effect’s imprudence and over prudence of family altruism. The comeback to risk aversion is also 
ambiguous and it results either in increasing or in decreasing relative risk aversion. The paper 
argues that the decreasing risk aversion results in the optimum quantity of money. 
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Introduction to indirect utility function of satisficing optimal decision 
The analysis of consumption-leisure choice U=U(Q,H) with respect to the wage rate w and to the 
purchase price reduction and marginal savings got from the search, or to the value ∂P/∂S, has 
discovered many interesting phenomena. The satisficing consumer decision becomes optimal in 
the sense that it equalizes marginal costs of search with its marginal benefit and that equality 
provides the maximization of the utility function (Malakhov 2014). The use of the truly relative 
price, i.e., purchase price P with regard to the time of search S or to the place of purchase, 
enables the explanation of some anomalies of economic behavior like endowment effect, sunk 
costs sensitivity, little pre-purchase search of big ticket items, and, finally, Veblen effect and 
money illusion. From the point of view of the utility function U(Q,H) subject to 
w/∂P/∂S|const=Q/∂L/∂S, where the constraint represents the equality of marginal values of search 
w×∂L/∂S=Q×∂P/∂S, and the value ∂L/∂S represents the propensity to search, i.e., propensity to 
substitute labor L by search S, the equilibrium price  Pe becomes equal to the total of consumers’ 
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labor costs wL and transaction cost wS, or, if we consider the household activity as a specific 
form of search, decreasing the final price, the total of labor costs and transformation costs 
Pe=w(L+S): 
∂U / ∂H
∂U / ∂Q
= −
w
∂P / ∂S
∂2L / ∂S∂H = − w
T∂P / ∂S
=
w
w(L+ S)
=
w
Pe
(1)  
where the value T=1/∂2L/∂S∂H represent the time horizon until the same purchase, or the 
commodity lifecycle. 
Although the original values of the model ∂P/∂S and ∂L/∂S look unusual, their modeling tries not 
to forget the testament of A.Marshall, who told that “when a great many symbols have to be 
used, they become very laborious to any one but the writer himself” (Marshall 1920[1890], p.12). 
Sometimes such relative values are indispensable, especially when the original G.Stigler’s 
assumption is used (∂P/∂S<0; ∂2P/∂S2>0) or when the behavior of the propensity to search is 
derived ((∂L/∂S<0; ∂2L/∂S2<0). However, the understanding of these relative values can be 
simplified by the graphical illustration of the interrelation between implicit optimal decision and 
explicit satisficing decision (Fig.1): Beauty'
TH*
U (Q,H )
w∂L/∂S
∂P /∂S
=Q*
L+S H
Q
− w
∂P /∂S
	  
Шаг$43$if$wL/S=P/S$then$P0$–$T$
S
wL0
Pp
T
P(S)
PS
P
e
L
wL(S)
−∂P / ∂Sw
 
Fig.1. Implicit optimal decision and explicit satisficing decision 
The presentation of relatives values in absolute terms, |∂P/∂S| and |∂L/∂S| also facilitates their 
mathematical treatment without logical losses. This tactic enables to derive the marginal utility 
of money income and the marginal utility of money expenditures and to present marginal utilities 
of consumption and leisure with the respect to the given place of purchase (|∂P/∂S|const) in 
more habitual manner (Malakhov 2013): 
MUw = λ; (2.1)
MU |∂P/∂S| = −λ
w
|∂P / ∂S |
(2.2)
 
 
	   3	  
MUQ = λ
|∂P / ∂S |
|∂L / ∂S |
= λT |∂P / ∂S |
L+ S
= λ
Pe
L+ S
=
∂v
∂w
Pe
T −H
(3.1)
MUH = λ
w
|∂L / ∂S |
∂2L / ∂S∂H = λ w
|∂L / ∂S |
1
T
= λ
w
L+ S
=
∂v
∂w
w
T −H
(3.2)
 
The analysis of the second order cross partial derivatives, i.e, the change in the marginal utility 
of received money income with the change of the place of purchase, or ∂MUw /∂|∂P/∂S|, and the 
change in the marginal utility (disutility) of the habitual place of purchase with the change in 
money income, or ∂MU|∂P/∂S| /∂w, results in the following equation: 
eλ,|∂P/∂S| + eλ,w = e|∂P/∂S|.w -1   (4) 
Under the assumption of the diminishing efficiency of search the elasticity of price reduction 
e|∂P/∂S|.w  illustrates both the increase in the willingness to overpay and the decrease in time of 
search after the increase in the wage rate (|∂Pi/∂Si|>|∂Pj/∂Sj|è Pi>Pj;Si<Sj). Hence, it is always 
positive. When the value of the elasticity of price reduction e|∂P/∂S|.w is equal to one, we have 
eλ,|∂P/∂S| + eλ,w = 0   (5) 
The Equation (4) also enlightened the way for the comparative static analysis of the utility 
function. Indeed, it shows us that the indirect utility function depends on two variables in the 
following manner: 
v(w,|∂P/∂S|)= v(w,|∂P/∂S|(w))     (6) 
The total derivative of this utility function gives us the following: 
dv(w,|∂P / ∂S | (w)) = dw( ∂v
∂w
||∂P/∂S|const +
∂v
∂ |∂P / ∂S |
∂ |∂P / ∂S |
∂w
); (7)
dv
dw
= λ −λ
w
|∂P / ∂S |
∂ |∂P / ∂S |
∂w
= λ(1− e|∂P/∂S|,w )
 
We see that when the price reduction is unit elastic (e|∂P/∂S|.w=1), the Equation (5) takes place and 
the utility stays constant, or dv/dw=0. And the following choice of the purchase price which is 
accompanied by a greater price reduction (e|∂P/∂S|.w>1) decreases the utility of consumption-
leisure choice (Fig.2): 
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v(w)
wВ"
v(w)"
dv / dw < 0
 
Fig.2. Utility function under price dispersion 
 
Willingness to overpay as insurance premium 
The appearance of the saddle point in the utility function gives an answer to the question what 
the consumer should do in order to avoid the decrease in utility. Obviously, he should decrease 
relative price reduction i.e., to be… not more modest, but less ambitious with regard to purchase 
prices after the following increase in the wage rate (|∂P/∂S|/∂w>0, but |e|∂P/∂S|.w<1). We see that 
it is really possible. However, this change represents the change in the model of behavior – from 
risk aversion to risk seeking. Indeed, the prospect theory tells us that facing the inevitable loss, 
here the decrease in utility, the consumer should take risk (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). 
Hence, the utility function changes its shape and becomes close to the cubic parabola. 
Usually, guarantees and insurance contracts increase both prices and price dispersion and we can 
await that guarantees and insurance contracts increase the equilibrium price reduction |∂P/∂S| 
that equalizes marginal costs of search with its marginal benefit.  
We can assume that the increase in the wage rate results not in the simple increase in the 
purchase price with respect to the increased income but in the increase in the insurance 
premium, accompanied by the increase in price reduction. The consumer details his insurance 
policy and increases the insurance premium with every increase in the wage rate. Other words, 
the consumer behaves like a homeowner who raises progressively the fence with any subsequent 
increase in income. And more insurance policies are detailed, the more efficient is the search, 
i.e., the greater is the absolute value of the equilibrium price reduction. 
 
Unwillingness to overpay for insurance as driver of risk behavior 
When we determine the second derivative of the utility function, we should keep in mind the 
marginal utility of money income λ as well as the unwillingness to overpay (1-e|∂P/∂S|.w) also 
represent functions of two variables. However, we can omit labor-intensive intermediate 
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calculations and to present the second derivative directly in its total form and in its elasticity 
form: 
d 2v
dw2
=
dλ
dw
(1− e|∂P/∂S|,w )+λ
d(1− e|∂P/∂S|,w )
dw
(8) 	  
d 2v
dw2
=
λ
w
(1− e|∂P/∂S|,w )(eλ ,w + eλ ,|∂P/∂S|e|∂P/∂S|,w + e(1−e|∂P/∂S|,w),w ) (9)  
The form of the total second derivative is very useful for the step-by-step analysis of changes in 
the model of behavior. The elasticity form, although its use is limited by critical points, is helpful 
in the derivation of the relative measure of risk aversion and in following optional high-order 
derivations of measures of prudence, which are omitted from the present analysis and left for 
analysts who are not afraid to work with relative values of the model. Thus, the relative Arrow-
Pratt measure takes the following form: 
η = −(eλ ,w + eλ ,|∂P/∂S|e|∂P/∂S|,w + e(1−e|∂P/∂S|,w),w ) (10)  
Although we get here the second order elasticity, it is rather simple to understand it. We can 
denote the value (1-e|∂P/∂S|.w) as the unwillingness to overpay and consider its elasticity with 
respect to the wage rate. When the increase in wage rate decreases the unwillingness to overpay, 
the second derivative d2v/dw2 is strictly negative. Moreover, while the unwillingness to overpay 
is decreasing, the absolute value of its elasticity e(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w is increasing.  And with the 
increase in absolute value of the elasticity of the unwillingness to overpay the relative risk 
aversion is increasing, i.e., the share of risky assets, i.e., unsecured consumption, is decreasing. 
Of course, it certainly happens if the subsequent increase in the wage rate and in the equilibrium 
value of price reduction always results in the increase in real balances, which follow the optimal 
consumption path, or (eλ,w +eλ,|∂P/∂S| e|∂P/∂S|.w) <0. The last assumption can be verified by the 
following transformation of the relative increase in real balances with the help of the Equation 
(4): 
eλ ,w + eλ ,|∂P/∂S|e|∂P/∂S|,w = eλ ,w + eλ ,|∂P/∂S|e|∂P/∂S|,w + eλ ,|∂P/∂S| − eλ ,|∂P/∂S| = (e|∂P/∂S|,w −1)(1+ eλ ,|∂P/∂S| ) (11)  
The Equation (11) tells us that when the price reduction elasticity of the marginal utility of 
money is positive, or eλ,|∂P/∂S|>0, the value (eλ,w +eλ,|∂P/∂S| e|∂P/∂S|.w) is non-positive, or (eλ,w 
+eλ,|∂P/∂S| e|∂P/∂S|.w) ≤0 for the values e|∂P/∂S|.w ≤1. Hence, when e|∂P/∂S|.w <1, any increase in wage 
rate raises real balances and decreases the marginal utility of money.  
The behavior of the utility function at this stage is described by the following expressions: 
1-e|∂P/∂S|.w >0; λ >0; dλ/dw<0; de(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w/dw<0è d2v/dw2<<0     (12) 
Here, the relative risk aversion is increasing because the consumer increases the overpayments 
or, in the case of insurance, makes the latter more and more detailed. The homeowner begins 
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with insurance for the house and he details it with furniture and paintings. Once there is no 
object to be insured except coffer. And the consumer insures it by the following increase in the 
wage rate and he spends on the coffer’s insurance the total increase in income. This action means 
that neither consumption nor real balances kept in the coffer are changed. The insurance policy 
becomes full or comprehensive. The elasticity of price reduction becomes equal to one 
(e|∂P/∂S|.w=1), the unwillingness to overpay becomes equal to zero (e(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w =0), and, 
according to the Equation (5) the increasing marginal utility of money expenditures completely 
offsets the decreasing marginal utility of money income:  
eλ,w +eλ,|∂P/∂S| e|∂P/∂S|.w= eλ,|∂P/∂S| + eλ,w = 0     (13) 
This stationary point B also represents the decision node (Fig.2). If the consumer decides to re-
insure his comprehensive insurance (e|∂P/∂S|.w>1) for the given level of consumption, he will 
decrease his money balances. Thus, the utility function will go down (dv/dw<0). The only way 
to increase both consumption and money balances is not to reduce absolute overpayments (the 
value ∂|∂P/∂S|/∂w is always positive) but to reduce relative overpayments, or to make them less 
income elastic, i.e., e|∂P/∂S|.w=0,9; 0,8; 0,7… etc. 
This decision increases the unwillingness to overpay. However, when the increase in the wage 
rate raises the unwillingness to overpay, the second derivative d2v/dw2 becomes positive. The 
consumer begins to seek risk: 
1-e|∂P/∂S|.w >0; λ >0; dλ/dw<0; de(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w/dw>>0;d2v/ dw2>0     (14) 
It happens because at the beginning the relative increase in the unwillingness to overpay is 
greater than the absolute value of the relative decrease in money balances, or  
((eλ,w +eλ,|∂P/∂S| e|∂P/∂S|.w) + e(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w ) >0. 
Here, we need some comments on the relationship between money balances and overpayments. 
The risk-seeking behavior means that the increase in consumption is not well secured. However, 
the insurance is provided not only by insurance policy but also by real balances, which could 
represent the precautionary savings. The risk-seeking model of behavior means that the total of 
precautionary savings and insurance policy is insufficient for the optimal level of consumption. 
It happens because here the relative increase in money balances is followed by the relative 
decrease in overpayments. Real balances as the tool of protection of consumption, i.e., of wealth, 
begin to substitute overpayments. 
Here we come to the question whether precautionary savings and insurance are substitutes or 
complements. In spite of some analytical solutions of this problem (Ehrlich and Becker (1972)), 
this question is still open in the general economic analysis. Moreover, when this issue is studied, 
the attention is usually paid to health and social insurance (Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995), 
Guariglia and Rossi (2004)). Here we can only assume the substitutability between money 
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balances and overpayments. The only reason for this assumption is the response of relative 
overpayments to the continuous decrease in the value of λ, i.e., in the marginal utility of 
increasing real balances. Moreover, we cannot use here without doubt the direct cross-price 
elasticity that is presented in the model by the price reduction elasticity of the marginal utility of 
money, or by the value eλ,|∂P/∂S|. While at this stage the consumer continues to increase 
overpayments but he makes it more modestly, the derivative ∂λ/∂|∂P/∂S| is still positive. 
However, the economic sense of the decrease in the relative overpayments with respect to the 
decrease in the marginal utility of money, i.e., in the “price” of money, presumes the 
substitutability. In addition, the increase in relative overpayments with respect to the decrease in 
the marginal utility of money presumes that when the consumer is risk-averse, money balances 
and overpayments becomes complements from the standpoint of the protection of wealth. In any 
way, the rather harmonic assumption that precautionary savings and insurance are complements 
in the risk-aversion model and they are substitutes in the risk-seeking model needs, and we are 
going to see it, more profound analysis. 
The comeback from risk seeking to risk aversion is quite ambiguous. While the positive 
elasticity of the unwillingness to overpay e(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w  is decreasing, once it certainly matches 
the negative elasticity of the marginal utility of money: 
eλ,w +eλ,|∂P/∂S| e|∂P/∂S|.w + e(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w  =0     (14) 
The analysis of the second derivative of the utility function discovers two possible outcomes 
from the risk neutrality While the first part of the Equation (14) (eλ,w +eλ,|∂P/∂S| e|∂P/∂S|.w) is always 
negative, or the absolute value of the decrease in the marginal utility of money with the increase 
in the wage rate is greater than its increase with the price reduction, the model of behavior 
depends here on the decision whether to continue to decrease relative overpayment and to 
increase the unwillingness to overpay (e(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w>0), or to increase relative overpayments and 
to decrease, as it was done on low levels of income, the unwillingness to overpay (e(1-
e|∂P/∂S|.w),w<0). The continuous increase in real balances with the decreasing marginal utility of 
money provides the negative second derivative d2v/dw2 in both outcomes. However, the 
continuous increase in the unwillingness to overpay, i.e., in the unwillingness to detail and to 
enlarge insurance, results in the “steeper” sortie from the risk neutrality. We can verify this fact 
without laborious calculations of high-order derivatives but with simple back-on-the envelope 
reasoning. The continuous increase in the unwillingness to overpay simply states the fact that the 
consumer relies more on precautionary savings than on insurance and he increases the share of 
risky assets, i.e., the share of uninsured commodities. Hence, his relative risk aversion becomes 
decreasing. On the other hand, if he chooses the extension of insurance policy, he increases his 
risk aversion. The option to restart the insurance activity and to detail insurance policies results 
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in the flat transformation of the utility curve. And with the increasing risk aversion the consumer 
should come again to new saddle point with the unit elasticity of the price reduction e|∂P/∂S|.w=1 
on the lower level of utility (Fig.3): 
v(w)
w
de(1−e|∂P/∂S|,w)
dw <0
de(1−e|∂P/∂S|,w)
dw >0 M
 
 
Fig.3.Decreasing vs. increasing relative risk aversion 
The path of the decreasing relative risk aversion is more intriguing. There, the consumer can 
continue to decrease relative overpayments until the moment when the value of price reduction 
|∂P/∂S| becomes constant. At this moment the elasticity of the unwillingness to pay e(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w  
as well as the elasticity of price reduction e|∂P/∂S|.w becomes equal to zero, and the second 
derivative of the utility function in the Equation (8) gets its “true” value, or d2v/dw2=dλ/dw, i.e., 
the marginal utility of income becomes unit elastic. It looks like the signaling that now the 
consumer could activate his insurance activity. However, the maximum value of real balances, 
accompanied with the constant overpayments, gives an idea that at the saddle point M on the 
decreasing risk aversion curve the consumer gets the optimum quantity of money, where the 
“true” value of real becomes equal to zero because the marginal utility of money becomes equal 
to zero. The constant |∂P/∂S| value simply represents the prolongation of insurance policy for the 
coffer where the optimum quantity of money is held. 1  This assumption corresponds to 
M.Friedman’s reasoning on the optimum quantity of money:  
“The amount held will, at the margin, reduce utility – because of concern about the safety of the 
cash, perhaps, or because of pecuniary costs of storing and guarding the cash.” (Friedman 2005 
[1969], p.18). 
There, the ratio of real balances, i.e., of precautionary savings, to consumption, is so important 
that it protects against any disaster. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 In the original model of search the constant |∂P/∂S| value means that consumer continues to buy commodities in 
the same place or in the same store for the same price.  
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This assumption raises the question why the consumer cannot change the manner of risk 
aversion at low levels of income, i.e., why the shift from the increasing to the decreasing risk 
aversion cannot take place at low values of relative overpayments e|∂P/∂S|.w<<1. Moreover, it 
seems that in this case the consumer could avoid saddle points and he could reproduce the exact 
contour of the Friedman-Savage’s “snake”. However, in this case high values of the marginal 
utility of money balances of low income levels could hardly be offset by the marginal decrease 
in the unwillingness to overpay and the consumer will meet at the saddle point “catastrophic” 
consequences of both imprudence and over prudence. 
 
Economic and mathematical catastrophes: Veblen effect and family altruism 
When G.Becker issued his famous rationalization of family altruism, he stressed the importance 
of the role of security:  
Therefore, altruism helps families insure their members against disasters and other 
consequences of uncertainty: each member of an altruistic family is partly insured because all 
other members are induced to bear some of the burden through changes in contributions from 
the altruist (Becker 1981, pp.3-4).  
Hence, the family altruism can be introduced in our model as an additional insurance. There are 
two possible descriptions of this extra insurance. 
We can reproduce the decrease in the individual utility function of the head of the family when 
relative overpayments really become disproportionate to his individual security, or e|∂P/∂S|.w>1. 
The extra insurance is provided by the decrease in money balances (∂λ/∂w>0). However, the 
following set of equations demonstrates that the decrease in utility (∂v/∂w<0) is accompanied 
there not by the risk-seeking behavior but by risk-aversion (∂2v/∂w2<0). The utility function 
takes the form of parabola: 
1-e|∂P/∂S|.w >0; λ >0; dλ/dw>0; de(1-e|∂P/∂S|.w),w/dw<<0èd2v/dw2<0     (15) 
Here we could wait for the moment when money balances become equal to zero and the family 
changes her model of behavior. Unfortunately, in the absence of budget constraints the family 
could borrow. Moreover, in this case the marginal utility of money λ becomes negative and the 
head of the family can increase his utility if he continues to increase overpayments (λ<0; (1-
e|∂P/∂S|.w) <0;dv/dw>0). 
Here, the head of the family reproduces the Veblen effect. The previous analysis discovered the 
correspondence between negative marginal utility of money and the extra overpayments 
(Malakhov 2013). This is the first “pitfall” the stationary point B prepares for imprudent 
consumers. Moreover, from the individual point of view the Veblen-effect-like leaving of the 
saddle point looks more positive than the increase in the unwillingness to overpay. This way can 
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provide more utility until the moment when real balances will be exhausted or the borrowing 
will be closed and the comeback to ordinary risk-seeking behavior will take place (Fig.4): 
v(w)
w
Risk%seeking)
Veblen)eﬀect)
В"
 
Fig.4.The option of Veblen effect in risk-seeking behavior 
The occurrence of Veblen effect with regard to the previous reasoning on the optimum quantity 
of money tells us that Veblen effect can take place at rather modest levels of income where 
consumption is far from satiation. However, although this scenario can take place, it does not 
seem well compatible with the description of the individual utility function within the family. 
There is another possibility to present family altruism. We can pretend the head of the family to 
be more “economic man” and to separate altruism from the individual utility function. If we take 
the factor of giving as the share of the individual wage rate, we get the following utility function 
vg(w)=v(w)-gw. However, there we automatically get the other “pitfall” or the mathematical 
“bold”-type catastrophe due to the existence of the saddle point B in the original utility function 
(Fig.5): 
vg (w);
dvg dw
w
vg (w)
dvg dw
A" B" C" D"
 
Fig.5.”Bold” catastrophe of family altruism 
In this case the decrease in the utility function starts at point A when the consumer, the head of 
the family, is still risk averse and he continues to make protection of his wealth by the increasing 
real balances and by increasing overpayments. The continuous increase in overpayments 
discovers the unwillingness of the head of the family to economize. Here, the behavior looks like 
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“pure” altruism. However, once the head of the family changes the model of his behavior and he 
begins to make risky decisions. It happens at point B when he passes the saddle point of the 
original utility function with the unit elastic price reduction (e|∂P/∂S|.w=1). The following 
increasing unwillingness to overpay gives an idea that the nature of his altruism has been 
changed. The head of the family becomes more “pragmatic”.  Although his generosity does not 
exhausted, his purchase decisions become more prudent. They begin to look like investments. 
The investments in family reach its peak at point C. Finally, the head of the family begins to feel 
again the increase in his utility function and at point D he no longer suffers from his altruism, or 
he finally gets returns on investments: 
“Altruistic parents might not have more children than selfish parents, but they invest more in the 
human capital or quality of children because the utility of altruistic parents is raised by 
investment returns that accrue to their children.” (Becker 1981, p.12). 
Indeed, the movement of the utility curve from point A to point D reminds the parental behavior 
from the birth of a child till the go-out of a young man from the nest. At the beginning parents do 
not economize on purchases for babies. They are trying to buy everything of high quality and 
with guarantees. Once, at point B, these purchases take the form of investments, which even in 
prudent manner lead to point C in the bottom due to their importance. However, the earlier 
decision at point B to reduce relative overpayments continues to work and finally it pulls out the 
head of the family from the “pitfall”. 
When G.Becker cited King Lear’s Fool in order to illustrate the Rotten Kid Theorem by the 
parental willingness to delay contributions until last stage of life he did not take into account the 
possibility of saddle points in the parental utility function. We have seen that if the consumer 
continues to increase overpayments without change in the model of behavior his utility can go 
down infinitely.  Once upon a time King Lear simply missed that point. And from the literature 
point of view it would be better here to remember d’Artagnan-father, who contributed to his son 
(only or the whole?)  quinze écus, his horse, and some parental advices.  
 
Conclusion 
The analysis of consumer behavior presented in this paper discovers the methodological power 
of relative values, which are produced by the process of search. The common question addressed 
to the model presented here – what about interest rate – can be answered in the same manner, if 
we envisage the risk of delay of consumption, i.e., the risk of unexpected rise in prices, and 
explain overpayments as payments for consumer credit. In this case the comprehensive insurance 
is transformed in the comprehensive consumer credit and the extra comprehensive insurance 
(e|∂P/∂S|.w>1) is transformed into the refinancing of existing debt, a mortgage, for example. There 
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the risk seeking starts when the borrowing is closed and consumers increase risk of the delay in 
consumption. In addition, this approach can revive the discussion on the optimum quantity of 
money with an interesting argument. Indeed, when overpayments become constant they could 
represent not direct interest payments but some fixed expenditures the consumer pays to the 
government to finance the interest payments on money. Hence, residual constant overpayments 
show that real balances even on their optimal level are not costless.  
The question of the limp-sum taxation leads to the understanding that the model presented here 
could be useful in the analysis of the optimal taxation. If we substitute in the individual utility 
function the factor of giving by income tax we also get the “bold”-type catastrophe. However, if 
one tries to go further and to explain overpayments by VAT or excise tax, the coming trade-off 
between income taxes and overpayments should be examined with prudence.  
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